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Abstract:  This article investigates the interrelationships between finance and 
entrepreneurship by exploring regional discrepancies in France. The focus is (1) on regional 
differences in financial relationships, (2) on the way these relations influence financial 
constraints on new firms and (3) on the complementary/substitutable effects between funds. 
No path of exclusion is identified. Rather, firms that are self-constraining or suffer from a 
weak credit rationing are the ones that later on develop intensive relationships with banks. 
Substitution exists in almost all the French regions. Results suggest the departure point of an 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Financial constraints are among the impeding factors most cited for entrepreneurial dynamics 
to flourish (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). New firms do not generate 
enough earnings to self-finance their growth. Raising equity on financial market without any 
track record is usually forbidden and anyway too costly. Most of new firms, whose growth 
rate is not exponential, cannot be the target of venture capital funds or business angels. 
Finally, in spite of financial innovations, their external financing remains based on access to 
bank loans. And it can be assumed that new firms are highly constrained on the credit market 
too.  
Since a decade, this problem has received high attention. Many studies underline the 
high financial pressures supported by small firms as their informational system is 
insufficiently formalised (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994, Carpenter et al., 1994, Gilchrist 
and Himmleberg, 1995). Their informational disadvantage drives to informational 
asymmetries between creditors and debtors and produce situations of rationing in the credit 
market (Binks, et al., 1992, Berger and Udell, 1998).  
Despite the relative homogeneity of the banking supply in France, credit rationing 
appears to be not equally distributed among French regions (Bonnet et al., 2005). Some 
regional  differences are indeed still at work when financial constraints of new firms are 
analysed. In particular, the probability for a start-up to be unconstrained is superior (or equal 
for a few regions) in all the French regions in comparison with the Île-de-France region. That 
is, if they are regional differences at work as regards credit constraints new firms can suffer 
from, financial relationships are one of the most often cited solution for firms to tackle the 
problem  and, as a consequence,  it appears  interesting  to  study differences in financial 
relationships among regions as well.  
We use the French INSEE-Sine dataset which gives us information, at the micro level, 
on the financing policy of young firms when they are created and during the first four years of 
their life. In the following section, we introduce financial relationships as a way to bridge new 
firms’ capital gap. In the third section, the data and the method of treatment are introduced. 
The fourth section gives the main results.  
In brief, we show that financial constraints exist and are, above all, induced by firms 
themselves. They do not anticipate their financial needs, or they are afraid of asking for bank   3 
loans. Despite all the literature on financial constraints, we show that banks remain the main 
partner for providing finance to firms and that no dependency path can be identified when the 
access to bank loans is concerned. In addition, relations between banking constraints and 
banking relationships support the thesis of a substitution effect between banking finance and 
other external finance. This substitution effect exists in entrepreneurial regions that have 
developed proximity capital relationships and finance by other firms alongside a less 
developed banking finance. These results can be the departure point of a pecking order theory 
applied to new firms that integrate the entrepreneurial intensity of regions. 
 
2.  THE REDUCING OF NEW FIRMS CAPITAL GAP BY 
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
 
2.1. The new firms’ capital gap hypothesis 
From a theoretical point of view, the new firms credit gap hypothesis finds a strong support in 
the credit rationing theory (Stiglitz and Weiss,1981, Williamson, 1987). New firms cannot 
produce any track record, their informational system is rather opaque and their manager over-
optimistic (Ang, 1991). In consequence, informational asymmetries should be high; selection 
adverse and moral hazard more frequent, and credit rationing the solution for banks to limit 
their risk exposure. Information imperfections finally result in a finance gap (Binks et al., 
1992) that corresponds to the total refusal of the credit required by firms. In this case, new 
firms suffer from a strong credit rationing. Other constraints can be considered too. Firms can 
be financed for an amount inferior to the one they desire. This situation, described by Keeton 
(1979), corresponds to a weak credit rationing. Finally, some firms can internalise credit 
constraints as they anticipate refusal of credit by banks. In this case, they do not ask for credit 
at all and they suffer from a kind  of self-constraint  (Kon  and Storey, 2003, Cieply and 
Dejardin, 2010).  
This over-exposition of new firms to credit constraint is generally supposed to be higher 
when new firms are centred on innovative activities. Banks are indeed not suitable to finance 
specific investments (Williamson, 1988). Their risk exposure is too high whereas they are not   4 
interested in the future profit of successful innovative firms. For these firms, the value of 
collaterals for banks relatively to the amount which should be financed is too low. Credit 
rationing can thus be supposed to be higher for these innovative firms. 
 
2.2. The role of financial relationships for new firms 
The role of banking relationships 
The most common way for an “information-opaque” firm to reduce credit rationing is to build 
long-term relationships with banks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1998).  
Banking relationships make informational asymmetries, lack of credit availability and 
cost of credit decrease. They facilitate the exchange of information between bankers and 
firms. They facilitate the exchange of information between bankers and firms. The proximity 
which is bound with relationships gives bankers access to “soft” information
1
Finally, the problem for new firms is to establish such relationships. This problem leads 
to the question of exclusion in the credit market for new firms. To cope with this problem, the 
link between banking constraints and banking relationships must be analysed. A positive link 
between financial constraints and banking relationships should show the absence of exclusion 
and the presence of a training process in the credit market. 
 on which small 
firms’ access to loan depends. With the development of banking relationships, firms 
themselves are incited not to develop opportunist behaviours. Contingent contracts constitute 
a credible threat on the future financing of firms. If commitments are not fulfilled by 
borrowers, banks can indeed refuse to supply new loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). In 
addition, the development of banking relationships allows firms to benefit from a reputation 
of reliability that enables them to get loans with better conditions (Diamond, 1989). This 
reputation effect increases incentives for firms to respect their financial commitments (Bolton 
and Sharfstein, 1996, Boot and Thakor, 1994). Firms are not encouraged to transgress 
commitments anymore insofar as while reputation building is slow its destruction is 
instantaneous. The advantage of bank loans is particularly important for innovative firms if 
they need confidentiality in the access to external finance (Osha, 1995, Bhattacharya and 
Chiesa, 1995).   
                                                 
1 Soft information is “in the air” and is integrated in a diffuse way by bankers. This information is opposed to 
“hard” information which concerns financial accounts and formalized information such as legal statute, formal 
agreements and all other reporting devices (Stein, 2002).   5 
Despite all these benefits, we must mention that banking relationships can induce new 
costs for firms too. With banking relationships, firms have to cope with the risk of rent 
expropriation (Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992). As banks internally own private information on 
firms, as this private information cannot be transferred, they benefit from a monopoly power 
on the credit market. The consequence for firms of this is a higher cost of loan relatively to 
the risk exposure of banks. Information sharing may indeed serve as a collusive device which 
can soften competition (Bouckaert and Degryse, 2004). To reduce the monopoly power of 
banks, the solution could be to develop relationships with several banks (Von Thadden, 
2004). This solution is not perfect as it induces the “winner’s curse” problem: the banking 
competitor will indeed only attract the riskiest firms (Rajan, 1992, Von Thadden, 2004). 
Another limit is the decrease in the investment of banks in the depth of the banking 
relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, Boot, 2000). However, for new firms this solution is 
not realistic. Dietsch and Golitin-Boubakari (2002) collects evidence for 2000 that very small 
firms (turnover < 2 million EUR) work with only one bank, and small firms (2<turnover<7.5 
million EUR), with only two banks. As relationships with several banks are limited for small 
firms, it should be more limited with new firms. Another solution should be to develop 
financial relationships with non banking partners in order to either diversify their portfolio of 
lenders or signal their quality to banks.  
 
The role of other non financial partners  
Banks are not the only financial supports of new firms. Other partners can be identified. First, 
bearing in mind the role of established firms as regards new firms, and above all the 
traditional central role of large firms in the French industrial landscape, the role of other firms 
is considered (Hancké and Cieply, 1996). Commercial partners supply trade credit to their 
customers. According to Petersen and Rajan (1995), this mean of financing is often the only 
one firms can obtain when they suffer from credit rationing. In this case, trade credit appears 
as a substitute for bank loans. Another effect of trade credit on bank loans can be identified: 
trade credit and other long-term financial relations between established firms and new firms 
can signal the quality of new firms to bankers. In this sense, established firms, and, especially 
so in the French context, large manufacturing firms, can act as a “go-between” between banks 
and small firms, all the more so since they are new. Because of their position vis-à-vis new 
firms, established firms own a vast amount of operational inside knowledge which can be   6 
transferred to banks either as hard evaluations. This information then becomes part of the 
evaluation package that banks can use in their SME’s assessment. 
Second, new firms can be financed by financial partners which supply them with equity. 
This is particularly the case of venture capital funds the activity of which has sharply 
increased in France. Venture capital institutions are known for their high expertise in 
screening and monitoring projects, particularly highly innovative ones (Berger and Udell, 
1998). As a consequence, when they provide equity to new firms, they not only finance them, 
they signal the quality of firms to outsiders as well.  
Third, new  firms can be financed by other investors who benefit from private 
information on the quality of the firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977). This is the case of the manager 
himself. Friends and family own “soft” information too. They all correspond to the “proximity 
finance”. Ang (1991) call them the “3F” (Family, Friend and “Fools”). Their financial support 
to new firms can signal their quality to outsiders in addition. 
Finally, two alternative views may be proposed to analyse the role of non banking 
investors: either they substitute for banks and bridge the bank loan gap; or they supplement 
bank loans and sometimes incite banks to increase their supply of credit to new firms by 
producing a signal effect on the quality of new firms.  
 
3.  SETTING UP THE EMPIRICS 
The INSEE-Sine dataset is exploited to empirically test the influence of local finance on the 
probability to be less or more financially constrained. These data give information on the 
financing policy of young firms when they are created and when they eventually face 
financial problems two years later. We construct classes that are representative of credit 
constraints and variables that are representative of an a priori index  of highly intensive 
relationships with the different potential financial partners.   7 
3.1. Data  
The survey (Sine 94-1) was conducted by the French National Institute of Statistical and 
Economic Studies
2 in 1994 and takes into account 30 778 firms which had been set-up or 
taken over during the first half of 1994 and which had survived for at least one month. The 
sample
3 is representative of the total population of entrepreneurs which was of 96 407 new 
firms. In this survey, new firms are identified on the basis of their registration in the “Système 
d'Informations et de Répertoire des Entreprises et des Etablissements” (SIRENE repertory4
A second survey carried out in 1997 (Sine 94-2) gives us information about the status 
of the same firms (closed down or still running). In 1997, 16 039 firms were still running and 
replied to the second survey. For the firms that are still running, this survey also explores the 
financial behaviour of the firm during the last two years and the financial problems they 
faced. On the basis of this second survey, we construct classes of credit rationing. For a more 
appropriate homogeneity of our dataset we consider only new firms without legal change 
(firms which are transformed from sole proprietorship into limited partnership), set up by a 
man or a woman (without subsidiaries) in the metropolitan area (overseas department 
excluded). At this stage remain 12 681 firms. 
). 
The units under review belong to the private productive sector in the fields of industry, 
building, trade and services. This survey identifies qualitative data surrounding 
entrepreneurship and, more precisely, it contains variables related to the entrepreneur, to the 
context and to the environment of entrepreneurship. 
 
3.2. Indicators of credit rationing and financial relationships 
The classes that are representative of credit rationing are constructed with the combination of 
questions from both the first survey of 1994 and the complementary survey of 1997. The first 
questions, extracted from Sine 94-1, give information about the asking for bank loans by 
                                                 
2 INSEE (Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques). 
3 The sample was built by randomly drawing out samples from the 416 (2x8x26) elementary strata. These strata 
are classified according to the origin (start-up or takeover: 2 modalities), the branch (8 modalities) and the 
localization (22 French regions plus 4 overseas départements). The databases must then be used with the 
correction of a weight variable (the reverse of the draw rate per branch, per region and per origin). 
4  Yet economic “activations” and “reactivations” are excluded from the surveyed sample. Economic 
“activations” correspond to units which do not have any activity and which decide to exercise one. Economic 
“reactivations” correspond to units which had stopped their activity and which start up again. They only deal 
with individual entrepreneurs –craftsmen or shopkeepers-. Financial and agricultural activities and the French 
units established abroad are set aside as well.   8 
firms before their setting-up and the decision of banks (either to lend or not to lend). The 
other questions are extracted from the second survey of 1997 and take into account financial 
problems the firm faced over the last two years. Using the survey of 1997, we only consider 
the situation of firms which were established in 1994 and which were still alive in 1997. This 
methodological choice allows us not to consider as rationed firms the ones that were “lame 
ducks” and that were identified as bad firms by bankers. A good discrimination process, 
which consists in not lending to bad firms (firms that will quickly die), should not be 
considered as a rationing process. Additionally, we only consider firms that have actually 
invested over the last two years. 
Following Cieply and Dejardin (2010), four modalities of the variable “financial 
constraint” can be distinguished: 
1.  The “No rationing” modality is made up of two kinds of firms. The first ones 
asked for bank loans and were granted them. The second ones did not ask for 
bank loans and did not face any financial problems during 1996-1997. 
2.  The “Self constraint” modality concerns firms that did not ask for bank loans 
but should  have asked for some as they faced financial constraints during 
1996-1997. 
3.  The “Weak constraint” modality groups together firms that did ask for bank 
loans and were granted them but they faced financial problems during 1996-
1997. 
4.  The “Strong rationing” modality gathers firms that did ask for bank loans and 
were refused them in 1994. 
The variables that are representative for financial relationships are constructed with 
the combination of several questions of the 1997 survey regarding the financial management 
policy of cash requirement, the financial management policy of investment, and the inter-firm 
financial cooperation links in 1994. Four variables are constructed.  
1.  The first one is the “highly intensive relationships” with banks. Firms in this 
class  manage cash requirement by overdrafts or bank loans and/or finance 
investments by bank loans. 
2.  The second one is the “highly intensive relationships” with “3F”:  Family, 
Friend and “Fools” (Ang, 1991),  or proximity finance. Firms in this class   9 
manage their cash requirement and finance their investments by private 
resources (from managers, relatives and/or existing associates). 
3.  The third variable is the “highly intensive relationships” with external finance 
providers. Firms manage their requirement and/or finance their investments by 
raising new equities. 
4.  The last variable is about financial links between enterprises (high intensive 
relationships with other firms). Strong financial links of cooperation with other 
firms are identified in 1994 and firms manage financial difficulties during 
1996-1997 by increasing terms of payments. 
 
3.3. Discovering regional discrepancies in financial relationships 
Referring to the French economy, the existence of constraints regarding entrepreneurship is 
often pointed out as explaining the low propensity of entrepreneurship (Abdesselam et al., 
2004a).  
Creating firm results from a complex combination of motivations (taste for 
entrepreneurship, desire to be independent etc.), of situational variables (to be unemployed) 
and of constraints (access to financial, technical and informational resources etc.): all these 
variables describing a more or less favorable environment for entrepreneurship (Shapero, 
1982, Lacasse et Lambert, 1989).  
Regarding financial resources, the intensity of credit rationing may be related with the 
geographical localization of the firm newly set up or taken over. Previous results on financial 
constraints (Bonnet  et al., 2005) have shown that the probability to be unconstrained is 
superior (or equal for a few regions) in all the French regions in comparison to the referent 
region (Île-de-France). The capital-region then appears as a region where strong financial 
constraints are at work especially for takeovers.  
Yet the existence of decentralized financial institutions, venture capital institutions, 
and/or business angels, even the financial links that young firms may build up with other 
firms, may also differentiate in a broader perspective the access to financial resources and 
have an influence both on the propensity to set up a firm and on the duration of new firms 
(Guiso et al., 2004). The entrepreneurs embedded in entrepreneurial networks generally 
benefit from the financial support of relatives and then create enterprises with a larger initial 
size (Volery and Servais, 2001). Is it this embedding characteristic of territories marked by an   10 
entrepreneurial culture that favors the access to proximity financial resources? In which 
amount could it explain the possibility to depart from banking financial relationships 
(substitutability) or on the contrary is it constitutive of a signal that allows banks to develop 
more banking relationships (complementarities)? 
It could be noticed here that Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes and the southern regions of 
France (Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées) 
display a strong entrepreneurship propensity among their population. It is globally accounted 
for by a high number of start-ups by inhabitant and by a high weight of start-ups versus 
takeovers in the total population of new firms. This is especially the case of Île-de-France 
where very strong entrepreneurship intensity with regard to the single population of start-ups 
may be observed (Abdesselam et al., 2004b). Let us note additionally that regions of the 
North and the East of France of ancient industrialization (Franche-Comté, Champagne-
Ardenne, Picardie, Lorraine, Nord-Pas-de-Calais) and the Limousin and the Centre regions 
are regions with a relatively low entrepreneurial propensity. Consequently, some results will 
be presented in distinguishing entrepreneurial regions from the others. 
 
4.  LOOKING FOR REGIONAL  DISCREPANCIES IN 
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
To study regional discrepancies in financial relationships, logistic regression according to 




experienced more financial relationships with banks and less financial relationships with 3F 
and other firms. In the less entrepreneurial regions banks are the main providers of finance to 
new firms; banks substitute the lack of local direct finance. If we consider the model with all 
the regions, most of the French regions are found to have more highly intensive relationships 
with banks than the region Île-de-France, even the two entrepreneurial regions Aquitaine and 
Midi-Pyrénées. 
                                                 
5  PROVINCE is a dummy variable that gathers all the non-entrepreneurial regions of the country. The 
entrepreneurial regions are defined with the rate of entrepreneurial activity measured by an entrepreneurship rate 
(start-ups+takeovers  /  10000 inhabitants). Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes  and the southern regions of France 
(Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées) display a very strong 
propensity to entrepreneurship and constitute our entrepreneurial regions.   11 















PROVINCE  0.2137***  -0.1463***  -0.0861  -0.3913*** 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE  0.4277***  -0.4946***  0.0482   -0.9663 
PICARDIE  0.3751***  -1.0304***  0.8906***  -1.1962 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE  0.00925  -0.0272  -0.3173  -1.9032* 
CENTRE  0.2973***  -0.2209**  -0.7838*  -0.8402* 
BASSE-NORMANDIE  0.6313***  -0.5787***  0.5308  -1.9353* 
BOURGOGNE  0.1196  -0.1430  0.1275  -1.3313* 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS  0.1113*  -0.0982  0.0899  -0.8283** 
LORRAINE  0.2202***  -0.0855  -0.3885  -0.5067 
ALSACE  -0.0034  -0.1045  -0.1466  ns 
FRANCHE-COMTE  0.4515***  -0.4160***  -0.9199  0.2786  
PAYS DE LA LOIRE  0.3619***  0.0148  -0.0939  -0.3448 
BRETAGNE  0.390***  -0.3606***  -0.6694  -1.2111** 
POITOU-CHARENTES  0.3607***  -0.329***  -0.9694  -0.2382 
AQUITAINE  0.3107***  -0.4404***  0.3171  -0.7384** 
MIDI-PYRENEES  0.4980***  -0.3993***  -0.3258  -1.3488*** 
LIMOUSIN  0.8163***  -0.9554***  0.7956*  ns 
RHÔNE-ALPES  -0.0354  -0.0614  -0.1777  -0.5568** 
AUVERGNE  -0.0967  -0.0195  0.8653***  -0.0857 
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON  -0.0177  -0.1692*  0.2315  -1.1815*** 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur  -0.0801  0.0537  0.3589*  -0.4134 
CORSE  0.6901***  -0.3016  -1.1619  0.0691 
ÎLE-DE-FRANCE is the reference class for the second model. 
 
The Spearman correlations (Table 2) show that highly intensive relationships with 
banks and highly intensive relationships with 3F are negatively correlated, which tends to 
confirm, at a regional level, the substitution effect. 
 
Table 2: Spearman correlations between Financial Relationships 
Spearman  Banks  3f  External  Other 
Banks  1       
3F  -0,757  1     
External  -0,308  -0,094  1   
Other  -0,221  0,328  -0,192  1 
 
 
To have a precise idea of the substitution/complementary effect, we made the cross 
table between these two variables at the individual (firm) level and calculated the Chi2 square 
by regions (Table 3).  
   12 
Table 3: Cross Table Highly intensive relationships with banks / with 3F 
 
3F relations among 
firms with banking 
relations (%) 
3F relations among 
firms without banking 
relations (%)  Chi 2 
ÎLE-DE-FRANCE  9,68  25,47  259.54*** (<.0001) 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE  4,39  19,65  28,02*** (<.0001) 
PICARDIE  5,38  8,10  1.89 (0,16) ns 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE  5,97  26,25   49,59*** (<.0001) 
CENTRE  7,71  21,07  35,72*** (<.0001) 
BASSE-NORMANDIE  7,64  13,95   5,90** (0,0151) 
BOURGOGNE  4,88  24,75  54,72*** (<.0001) 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS  8,25  21,29  43,43*** (<.0001) 
LORRAINE  8,73  22,57  32,1*** (<.0001) 
ALSACE  8,93  19,68  18,43*** (<.0001) 
FRANCHE-COMTE  8,36  15,38  5,05** (<.0246) 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE  8,74  25,89  67,36*** (<.0001) 
BRETAGNE  4,33  24,09  104,21*** (<.0001) 
POITOU-CHARENTES  6,48  20,52  31,20*** (<.0001) 
AQUITAINE  6,71  16,14  34,16*** (<.0001) 
MIDI-PYRENEES  7  18,13  41,98*** (<.0001) 
LIMOUSIN  4,98  11,24  3,94** (<.0473) 
RHÔNE-ALPES  10,46  19,49  42,56*** (<.0001) 
AUVERGNE  6,38  21,43  26,23*** (<.0001) 
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON  5,29  21,85  74,07*** (<.0001) 
PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE 
D'AZUR 
8,30  25,66 
117,29*** (<.0001) 
CORSE  3,40  30,99  33,57*** (<.0001) 
 
 
Clearly it appears that the substitution between banks and 3F effect exists in all the 
French regions except one region where there is no significant effect, Picardie. 
By characterizing the different financial relationships with the control variables of the 
logistic regressions6
By considering the relationships with 3F, we observe that takeovers develop less 
intensive ones. By contrast, being unemployed or belonging to a non-European country is 
characteristic of more intensive relationships with 3F. If we consider jobs created by these 
new enterprises, five French regions show a very favorable evolution, both for start-ups and 
takeovers: Midi-Pyrénées, Rhône-Alpes, Poitou-Charentes, Bourgogne and Champagne-
, we notice that takeovers have developed higher intensive relationships 
with banks; the same applies for firms which high amounts of money invested in the project, 
as well as when the example of the entourage was the main motivation to set up the firm. On 
the contrary, being unemployed, or responding to a new idea for the motivation to set-up the 
firm, mean significantly less intensive relationships with banks. 
                                                 
6 Complete tables, including results for control variables, are available upon request from the authors.   13 
Ardenne.  Conversely, regions that present the worst performances in terms of jobs are 
Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon and Île-de-France. At this level of 
aggregation, it seems however difficult to link these results with the intensity of financial 
relationships firms may have developed in these regions. If takeovers devoid of any constraint 
at the beginning (especially financial constraints) are more prone to create new jobs, it is 
nevertheless not possible, using data analysis methods, to associate  this model to some 
specific French regions (Abdesselam et al., 2004a). That being, a public policy for creating 
new jobs would a priori  yield better positive results in the short term by alleviating 
constraints on takeover firms, whereas discovering new products, new markets conditioning 
the creation of future new jobs, would be rather more important in the case of new ventures or 
ex-nihilo start–ups.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
To conclude, new firms significantly suffer from a lack of access to finance. The 
constraint may be above all due to the apprehension of the manager-owner to ask for credit. 
Strong rationing which corresponds to credit refusal by banks only matters for a very small 
part of financial constraint. Moreover, the existence of a banking constraint at the beginning 
of firms’ life does not induce the absence of banking relationships in the future. Banking 
relationships cannot be strictly associated with the absence of credit rationing at birth. This 
observation supports the thesis the fact that no path of exclusion can be identified on the 
credit market. In addition; any kind of signals from informed partners to banks cannot be put 
into light. On the contrary, banks and others investors are more substitutable than 
complementary when financing new firms is concerned. So, the financial story of new firms 
created in late 20
th century in France is clear: they suffered from financial constraints as they 
did not obtained the total credit required but were partly financed so that banking 
relationships could be  developed and future investments and working capital could be 
financed by banks. In the period between setting up and becoming bankable, other financing 
means are substitutes for bank loans and do not product any signal effect at the moment they 
are supplied to new firms. Entrepreneurial regions which are characterized by a higher 
percentage of strong rationing and self-constraint at the beginning tend to develop less highly   14 
intensive relationships with banks but more highly intensive relationships with the proximity 
capital and highly intensive relationships with other firms. 
These results could be at least partially explained by the economic structures and the 
different characteristics of the regional development, especially in terms of the association 
between the previous occupation of the entrepreneur and the motivation to set up the firm. 
Additionally these results could be explained by financial characteristics. They can indeed be 
the departure point of a “pecking order theory”
7
 
  applied to new firms that integrate the 
entrepreneurial intensity of regions. In the most entrepreneurial regions, the investment policy 
of firms is more uncertain, projects are more volatile and finally the risk exposure of banks is 
higher than in less entrepreneurial regions. Banks can thus be reluctant to finance all the 
external demand of financing, which is high relative to other regions. In these regions, the 
entrepreneurial atmosphere provides solutions to new firms as proximity finance and 
interfirms relationships are more intensively developed. In highly entrepreneurial regions, the 
external financing of firms is based first on proximity finance and interfirms relationships and 
only secondly on banks. In the less entrepreneurial regions, projects are less volatile and 
investments less based on specific assets. Banking finance is easier and can substitute for the 
lack of both proximity finance and interfirms relationships. Finally in these  low 
entrepreneurial regions, the external financing of new firms is based first on banking finance 
and secondly on proximity finance and interfirms financial relationships. 
 
                                                 
7  According to the classic pecking order theory (Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984), firms prefer first 
internal finance, second debt (unrisky then risky) and third raising new equity. This hierarchy is modified for 
innovative firms, whose assets are highly specific (Williamson, 1988). In this case, raising new equities is 
preferred to loans.    15 
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